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Abstract
In this paper we identify and characterize an analysis of two problematic
aspects affecting the representational level of cognitive architectures (CAs): the
size and the typology of the encoded knowledge. We argue that such aspects
may constitute not only a technological problem that, in our opinion, should
be addressed in order to build artificial agents able to exhibit intelligent be-
haviours in general scenarios, but also an epistemological one, since they limit
the plausibility of the comparison of CAs’s knowledge representation and pro-
cessing mechanisms with those executed by humans in their everyday activities.
In the final part of the paper further directions of research will be explored,
trying to address current limitations and future challenges.
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1. Introduction
Handling a considerable amount of knowledge, and selectively retrieving it
according to the needs emerging in different situational scenarios, is an impor-
tant aspect of human intelligence. For this task, in fact, humans adopt a wide
range of heuristics [1] due to their bounded rationality [2]. In this perspective,
one of the requirements that should be considered for the design, the realiza-
tion and the evaluation of intelligent cognitively-inspired systems should consist
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in their ability of heuristically identify, retrieve, and process, from the general
knowledge stored in their artificial Long Term Memory (LTM), that one which
is synthetically and contextually relevant. This requirement, however, is often
neglected. Currently, artificial cognitive systems and architectures are not able,
de facto, to deal with complex knowledge structures that can be even slightly
comparable to the knowledge heuristically managed by humans. In this paper
we will argue that this is not only a technological problem but also, in the light
of the distinction between functionalist and structuralist models of cognition,
an epistemological one. The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section
2 introduces the two main problematic aspects concerning the knowledge level
in cognitive architectures, namely the size and the homogeneous typology of the
encoded knowledge. Section 3 provides a focused review of the Knowledge Level
of four of the most well known and widely used cognitive architectures (namely
SOAR, ACT-R, CLARION and Vector-LIDA) by pointing out the respective
differences and, in the light of our axis of analysis, their problematic issues1. In
doing so we will illustrate the main attempts that have been proposed to address
such problems and we will highlight the current limitations of such proposals.
In the final sections, we present an overview of three different alternative ap-
proaches that can provide a possibile solution for dealing with, jointly, both the
size and the knowledge homogeneity problems: namely the Semantic Pointer
Perspective (section 4), the idea of Conceptual Space as intermediate level of
representation connecting connectionist and symbolic approaches (section 5)
and the novel versions of the Hybrid Neuro Symbolic Approaches currently de-
veloped in the field of CAs (section 6). Interestingly all such proposals converge
in suggesting that the neural level of representation can be considered irrele-
vant for attacking the above mentioned problems, and suggest to address these
issue by operating at more transparent and abstract levels of representation.
Section 7, finally, considers the dual process approach as a possible reference
1In the present paper we will leave aside many other aspects (e.g. those related to the
knowledge acquisition problems) which are related to, and also affect, the problems into focus.
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framework for the integration of different types of knowledge processing mecha-
nisms assumed to cooperate in a CA assuming a heterogeneous representational
perspective.
2. Open Issues: Knowledge Size and Knowledge Homogeneity
Current cognitive artificial systems and architectures are not equipped with
knowledge bases comparable with the conceptual knowledge that humans pos-
sess and use in the everyday life. From an epistemological perspective this lack
represents a problem: in fact, endowing cognitive agents with more realistic
knowledge bases, in terms of both the size and the type of information encoded,
would allow, at least in principle, to test the artificial systems in situations closer
to that one encountered by humans in real-life. This problem becomes more rel-
evant if we take into account the knowledge level of Cognitive Architectures [3],
[4]. While cognitively-inspired systems, in fact, could be designed to deal with
only domain-specific information (e.g. let us think to a computer simulator of a
poker player), Cognitive Architectures (CA), on the other hand, have also the
goal and the general objective of testing - computationally - the general models
of mind they implement. Therefore: if such architectures only process a simplis-
tic amount (and a limited typology) of knowledge, the structural mechanisms
that they implement concerning knowledge processing tasks (e.g. that ones of
retrieval, learning, reasoning etc.) can be only loosely evaluated, and compared,
w.r.t. that ones used by humans in similar knowledge-intensive situations. In
other words: from an epistemological perspective, the explanatory power of
their computational simulation is strongly affected (on these aspects see [5], [6],
[7]). This aspect is problematic since this class of systems, designed according
to the “cognition in the loop” approach, aims both at i) detecting novel and
hidden aspects of the cognitive theories by building properly designed computa-
tional models of cognition and ii) at providing technological advancement in the
area of Artificial Intelligence of cognitive inspiration. In this perspective, purely
functionalist models [8], based on a weak equivalence (i.e. the equivalence
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in terms of functional organization) between cognitive processes and AI proce-
dures, are not considered as having a good explanatory power w.r.t. the target
cognitive system taken as source of inspiration. Conversely, the development
of plausible “structural” models of our cognition (based on a more constrained
equivalence between AI procedures and their corresponding cognitive processes)
are assumed to be the way to follow in order to build artificial cognitive models
able to play both an explanatory role about the theories they implement and to
provide advancements in the field of the artificial intelligence research.
By following this line of argument, therefore, we claim that computational
cognitive architectures aiming at providing a knowledge level based on the
“structuralist” assumption should address, at their representational level, both
the problems concerning the “size” and the “homogeneity” of the encoded
knowledge. Let us explore more in the details the nature of such aspects: while
the size problem is intuitively easy to understand (i.e. it concerns the dimension
of the knowledge base available to the agents), that one concerning the “types”
of the encoded knowledge needs some additional clarification and context. In
particular, this problem relies on the theoretical and experimental results com-
ing from Cognitive Science. In this field, different theories about how humans
organise, reason and retrieve conceptual information have been proposed. The
oldest one, known as “classical” or Aristotelian theory, states that concepts - the
building blocks of our knowledge infrastructure - can be simply represented in
terms of sets of necessary and sufficient conditions (and this is completely true,
for example, for mathematical concepts: e.g. an EQUILATERAL TRIANGLE
can be classically defined as a regular polygon with 3 corners and 3 sides). In
the mid ’70s of the last Century, however, Rosch’s experimental results demon-
strated its inadequacy for ordinary –or common sense– concepts, that cannot
be described in terms of necessary and sufficient traits [9]. In particular, Rosch’s
results showed that the conceptual knowledge is organized in our mind in terms
of prototypes. Since then, different theories of concepts have been proposed to
explain different representational and reasoning aspects concerning the typical-
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ity or, in other terms, the common-sense effects2. Usually, they are grouped
in three main classes, namely: prototype views, exemplar views and theory-
theories (see e.g. [10] [11]). All of them are assumed to account for (some
aspects of) typicality effects in conceptualization.
According to the prototype view (introduced by Rosch), knowledge about
categories is stored in terms of some representation of the best instances of the
category. For example, the concept BIRD should coincide with a representation
of a prototypical bird (e.g. a robin). In the simpler versions of this approach,
prototypes are represented as (possibly weighted) lists of features.
According to the exemplar view, a given category is mentally represented as
a set of specific exemplars explicitly stored within memory: the mental repre-
sentation of the concept BIRD is the set of the representations of (some of) the
birds we encountered during our lifetime.
Theory-theory approaches adopt some form of holistic point of view about
concepts. According to some versions of the theory-theories, concepts are anal-
ogous to theoretical terms in a scientific theory. For example, the concept BIRD
is individuated by the role it plays in our mental theory of zoology. In other ver-
sion of the approach, concepts themselves are identified with micro-theories of
some sort. For example, the concept BIRD should be identified with a mentally
represented micro-theory about birds.
Although these approaches have been largely considered as competing ones,
several results (starting from the work of [12]) suggested that human subjects
may use, in different occasions, different representations to categorize concepts.
Such experimental evidences led to the development of the so called “hetero-
geneous hypothesis” about the nature of concepts, hypothesizing that differ-
ent types of conceptual representations exist (and may co-exist): prototypes,
exemplars, theory-like, classical representations, and so on [11]. All such rep-
resentations, in this view, constitute different bodies of knowledge and contain
different types of information associated to the the same conceptual entity. Fur-
2A review of all the typicality-theories is in [10] and in [11].
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thermore, each body of conceptual knowledge is featured by specific processes in
which such representations are involved (e.g., in cognitive tasks like recognition,
learning, categorization, etc.). In particular prototypes, exemplars and theory-
like representations are associated with the possibility of dealing with typicality
effects and non-monotonic strategies of reasoning and categorization3, while
the classical representations (i.e. that ones based on necessary and/or sufficient
conditions) are associated with standard deductive mechanism of reasoning4. In
the representational level of the current cognitive architectures the heterogene-
ity hypothesis, assuming the availability of different types of knowledge encoded
in a conceptual structure, is almost neglected (even if with some differentiation
between the architectures exist as we will see in the next section). 5 In general,
3Let us assume that we have to categorize a stimulus with the following features: “it has
fur, woofs and wags its tail” the result of a prototype-based categorization would be dog, since
these cues are associated to the prototype of dog. Prototype-based reasoning, however, is not
the only type of reasoning based on typicality. In fact, if an exemplar corresponding to the
stimulus being categorized is available, too, it is acknowledged that humans use to classify it
by evaluating its similarity w.r.t. the exemplar, rather than w.r.t. the prototype associated to
the underlying concepts [11]. For example, a penguin is rather dissimilar from the prototype
of bird. However, if we already know an exemplar of penguin, and if we know that it is
an instance of bird, it is easier to classify a new penguin as a bird w.r.t. a categorization
process based on the similarity with the prototype of that category. This type of common
sense categorization is known in literature as exemplars-based categorization (and in this case
the exemplar is favoured w.r.t. the prototype because of the phenomenon known as old-
item effect). Finally, an example of theory-like common sense reasoning is when we typically
associate to a light switch the learned rule that if we turn it “on” then the light will be provided
(this a non monotonic inference with a defeasible conclusion). All these representations, and
the corresponding reasoning mechanisms, are assumed to be potentially co-existing according
to the heterogeneity approach.
4As before mentioned, an example of standard deductive reasoning is the categorization
as triangle of a stimulus described by the features: “it is a polygon, it has three corners and
three sides”. Such cues, in fact, are necessary and sufficient for the definition of the concept
of triangle.
5The heterogeneoty problem is a multifaceted one since, as mentioned, it not only assumes
the existence of multiple representations but, for each of them, different kinds of categorization
and reasoning mechanisms and processes are assumed to exist and need to be integrated in
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despite some efforts have been done to implicitly address the presented problems
they are, as we will show below, not completely satisfactory for solving, jointly,
both the mentioned limitations.
3. The Knowledge Level in Cognitive Architectures
Cognitive architectures have been historically introduced i) to capture, at
the computational level, the invariant mechanisms of human cognition, including
those underlying the functions of control, learning, memory, adaptivity, percep-
tion and action [13] and ii) to reach human level intelligence, also called AGI
(Artificial General Intelligence), by means of the realization of artificial artifacts
built upon them6. During the last decades many cognitive architectures have
been realized, - such as SOAR [15], ACT-R [16] etc. - and have been widely
tested in several cognitive tasks involving learning, reasoning, selective atten-
tion, recognition etc. However, as previously mentioned, they are affected by
the following problem: they are general structures without a general content.
Thus, every evaluation of systems relying upon them is necessarily task-specific
and do not involve not even the minimum part of the full spectrum of pro-
cesses involved in the human cognition when the knowledge comes to play a
role. In more practical terms this means that the knowledge embedded in such
architectures, and processed by artificial agents, is usually ad-hoc built, domain
specific, or based on the particular tasks they have to deal with. Such limita-
tion, however, affects the advancement in the cognitive research concerning how
the humans heuristically select and deal with the huge and variegated amount
of knowledge they possess when they have to: make decisions, reason about a
given situation or, more in general, solve a particular cognitive task involving
several dimensions of analysis. This problem, as a consequence, also limits the
advancement of the research in the area of Artificial General Intelligence. In
order to let intelligent behaviour emerge.
6There is an alternative perspective that sees CAs as the initial point of departure for the
subsequent autonomous development of a cognitive system (see [14]).
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the following we provide a short overview of some of the most widely known
and adopted CAs: SOAR [15], ACT-R [16], CLARION [17] and LIDA [18] (in
its novel version known as Vector-LIDA [19]). The choice of these architecture
has been based on the fact that they represent some of the most widely used
systems (adopted in scenarios ranging from robotics to video-games) and their
representational structures present some relevant differentiations that are inter-
esting to investigate in the light of the issues raised in this paper. By analyizing,
in brief, such architectures we will exclusively focus on the description of their
representational frameworks since a more comprehensive review of their whole
mechanisms is out of the scope of the present contribution (detailed reviews of
their mechanisms are described in [20]; and [21]; [22]). We will show how all
of them are affected, at different levels of granularity, by both the size and the
knowledge homogeneity problems 7.
3.1. SOAR
SOAR is one of the most mature cognitive architectures and has been used
by many researchers worldwide during the last 30-years. This system was con-
sidered by Newell a candidate for a Unified Theory of Cognition [4]. One of the
main themes in SOAR is that all cognitive tasks can be represented by problem
7By analyizing the latter aspect we will not not take into direct consideration the theory-
like representations introduced in the previous section, since the corresponding theory-theory
approach is, to a certain extent, more vaguely defined when compared to both prototypes and
exemplar based approaches. As a consequence, at present, its theoretical and computational
treatment seems to be more problematic. In addition we can take for granted that all the cur-
rently available architectures are able to learn some forms of ad-hoc micro-theories according
to their interaction with the external environment. A general objection that can be raised
to all of them is, however, that they are not architecturally equipped with mechanisms able
to define the dynamics of the interaction between this kind of theory-like typical knowledge
and the other common-sense knowledge components (e.g. prototypes or exemplars). In addi-
tion: such theories are local, they have no generality and the current CAs are not designed to
provide any kind of interaction process able to couple different local and possibly contrasting
micro-theories.
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spaces that are searched by production rules grouped into operators. These pro-
duction rules are fired in parallel to produce reasoning cycles. From a representa-
tional perspective, SOAR exploits symbolic representations of knowledge (called
chunks) and use pattern matching to select relevant knowledge elements. Basi-
cally, where a production match the contents of declarative (working) memory
the rule fires and then the content from the declarative memory (called Seman-
tic Memory in SOAR) is retrieved. This system adheres strictly to the Newell
and Simon’s physical symbol system hypothesis [23] which states that sym-
bolic processing is a necessary and sufficient condition for intelligent behavior.
W.r.t. to the size and the heterogeneity problems, the SOAR knowledge level
is problematic for both aspects. SOAR agents, in fact, are not endowed with
general knowledge and only process ad-hoc built (or task-specific learned) sym-
bolic knowledge structures 8. Such type of knowledge structures, in particular,
are usually heavily used to perform standard logical reasoning and, as a conse-
quence, are strongly biased towards a “classical” conceptualisation of knowledge
in terms of necessary or sufficient conditions. In general, symbolic representa-
tions strongly rely on the compositionality of meaning: where we can distinguish
between a set of primitive, or atomic, symbols and a set of complex symbols.
However, compositionality, despite being an important aspect of human concep-
tual systems, is somewhat at odds with the representation of concepts regarding
typicality [24]. As a consequence of this representational commitment, SOAR
agents are not equipped with common-sense knowledge components concerning,
for example, prototypical or exemplars-based representations9. Therefore the
8Despite this problem is acknowledged in [15] there is no available literature attesting
progresses in this respect.
9And this problem arises despite the fact that the chunks in SOAR can be represented as
a sort of frame-like structures containing some common-sense (e.g. prototypical) information.
In fact, the main problem of this architecture w.r.t. the heterogeneity assumption, relies on
the fact that it does not specify how the typical knowledge components of a concept, and
the corresponding non monotonic-reasoning strategy, can interact with a possibly conflict-
ing representational and reasoning procedures characterizing other conceptualisation of the
same conceptual entity. In short it assumes, like most of the symbolic-oriented CAs, the
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system is not able to deal with prototype and exemplars-based categorization
which, as described above, are two forms of common-sense conceptual reasoning
well established in human cognition and assumed to co-exist in the heteroge-
neous perspective.
3.2. ACT-R
ACT-R is a cognitive architecture explicitly inspired by theories and exper-
imental results coming from human cognition. Here the cognitive mechanisms
concerning the knowledge level emerge from the interaction of two types of
knowledge: declarative knowledge, that encodes explicit facts that the system
knows, and procedural knowledge, that encodes rules for processing declarative
knowledge. In particular, the declarative module is used to store and retrieve
pieces of information (called chunks, featured by a type and a set of attribute-
value pairs, similar to frame slots) in the declarative memory. ACT-R employs a
sub-symbolic activation of symbolic conceptual chunks representing the encoded
knowledge. Finally, the central production system connects these modules by
using a set of IF-THEN production rules.
Differently from SOAR, ACT-R allows to represent the information in terms
of prototypes and exemplars and allow to perform, selectively, either prototype
or exemplar-based categorization. This means that this architecture allows the
modeller to manually specify which kind of categorization strategy to employ
according to his specific needs. Such architecture, however, only partially ad-
dresses the homogeneity problem since it does not allow to represent, jointly,
these different types of common-sense representations conveying different types
of information for the same conceptual entity (i.e. it does not assume a het-
erogeneous perspective). As a consequence, it is also not able to autonomously
availability of a monolithic conceptual structure (e.g. a frame-like prototype or a “classical”
concept) without specifying how such information can be integrated and harmonized with
other knowledge components to form the whole knowledge spectrum characterizing a given
concept.
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decide which of the corresponding reasoning procedures to activate (e.g. proto-
types or exemplars) and to provide a framework able to manage the interaction
of such different reasoning strategies (however its overall architectural environ-
ment provides, at least in principle, the possibility of implementing cascade
reasoning processes triggering one another).
Even if some attempts exist concerning the design of harmonization strate-
gies between different types of common-sense conceptual categorizations (e.g.
exemplars-based and rule based, see [25]) however they do not handle the prob-
lem concerning the interaction of the prototype or exemplars-based processes
according to the results coming from the experimental cognitive science (for
example: the old item effect, privileging exemplars w.r.t. prototypes is not
modelled. See footnote 3 on this aspect.). Summing up: w.r.t. the hetero-
geneity problem, the components needed to fully reconcile the Heterogeneity
approach with ACT-R are present, however they have not been fully exploited
yet.
Regarding the size problem: as for SOAR, ACT-R agents are usually equipped
with task-specific knowledge and not with general cross-domain knowledge. In
this respect some relevant attempts to overcome this limitation have been re-
cently done by extending the Declarative Memory of the architecture. They will
be discussed in section 3.5 along with their current implications.
3.3. CLARION
CLARION is a hybrid cognitive architecture based on the dual-process the-
ory of mind. From a representational perspective, processes are mainly subject
to the activity of two sub-systems, the Action Centered Sub-system (ACS) and
the Non-Action Centered Sub-system (NACS). Both sub-systems store infor-
mation using a two-layered architecture, i.e., they both include an explicit and
an implicit level of representation. Each top-level chunk node is represented by
a set of (micro)features in the bottom level (i.e., a distributed representation).
The (micro)features (in the bottom level) are connected to the chunk nodes (in
the top level) so that they can be activated together through bottom-up or top-
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down activation. Therefore, in general, a chunk is represented by both levels:
using a chunk node at the top level and distributed feature representation at the
bottom level. W.r.t. to the size and the heterogeneity problems, CLARION,
encounter problems with both the levels since i) there are no available attempts
aiming at endowing such architecture with a general and cross-domain knowl-
edge ii) the dual-layered conceptual information does not provide the possibility
of encoding (manually or automatically via learning cycles) the information in
terms of the heterogeneous classes of representations presented in the section
2. In particular: the main problematic aspect concerns the representation of
the common-sense knowledge components. As for SOAR and ACT-R, also in
CLARION the possible co-existence of typical representations in terms of proto-
types, exemplars and theories (and the interaction among them) is not treated.
In terms of reasoning strategies, notwithstanding that the implicit knowledge
layer, based on neural network representations, can provide forms of non mono-
tonic reasoning (e.g. based on similarity), such kind of similarity-based reason-
ing is currently not grounded on the mechanisms guiding the decision choices
followed, for example, by prototype or exemplars-based reasoning.
3.4. Vector-LIDA
Vector LIDA is a cognitive architecture employing, at the representational
level, high-dimensional vectors and reduced descriptions. High-dimensional vec-
tor spaces have interesting properties that make them attractive for represen-
tations in cognitive models. The distribution of the distances between vectors
in these spaces, and the huge number of possible vectors, allow noise-robust
representations where the distance between vectors can be used to measure the
similarity (or dissimilarity) of the concepts they represent. Moreover, these
high-dimensional vectors can be used to represent complex structures, where
each vector denotes an element in the structure. However, a single vector can
also represent one of these same complex structures in its entirety by imple-
menting a reduced description, a mechanism to encode complex hierarchical
structures in vectors or connectionist models. These reduced description vec-
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tors can be expanded to obtain the whole structure, and can be used directly
for complex calculations and procedures, such as making analogies, logical in-
ference, or structural comparison. Vectors in this framework are treated as
symbol-like representations, thus enabling different kind of operations executed
on them (e.g. simple forms of compositionality via vectors blending). Vector-
LIDA, encounters the same limitations of the other CAs since i) its agents are
not equipped with a general cross-domain knowledge and therefore can be only
used in very narrow tasks (their knowledge structure is either ad hoc build or ad
hoc learned). Additionally, this architecture does not address the problem con-
cerning the heterogeneity of the knowledge typologies. In particular its knowl-
edge level does not represent the common-sense knowledge components such as
prototypes and exemplars (and the related reasoning strategies). In fact, as
for CLARION, despite vector-representations allow to perform many kind of
approximate comparisons and similarity-based reasoning (e.g. in tasks such as
categorization), the peculiarity concerning prototype or exemplars based repre-
sentations (along with the the design of the interaction between their different
reasoning strategies) are not provided 10.
3.5. Attempts to Overcome the Knowledge Limits
The problem concerning the limited knowledge availability for agents en-
dowed with cognitive architectures has been recently pointed out in literature
[13] and some technical solutions for filling this knowledge gap have been pro-
posed. In particular the use of ontologies and of semantic formalisms has been
10In this respect, however an element that is worth-noting is represented by the fact that
the Vector-LIDA representational structures are very close to the framework of Conceptual
Spaces. Conceptual Spaces are a geometric knowledge representation framework proposed by
Peter Ga¨rdenfors. They can be thought as a particular class of vector representations where
knowledge is represented as a set of quality dimensions, and where a geometrical structure
is associated to each quality dimension. They are discussed in detail in section 5. The con-
vergence of the Vector-LIDA representation towards Conceptual Spaces could enable, in such
architecture, the possibility of dealing with at least prototype and exemplars-based represen-
tations and reasoning, thus overcoming the knowledge homogeneity problem.
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seen as a possible solution for providing effective content to the structural knowl-
edge modules of the cognitive architectures. Some initial efforts have been done
in this sense11. In particular, within Mind’sEye program (a DARPA founded
project), the knowledge layers of ACT-R architecture have been semantically
extended with an external ontological content coming from three integrated se-
mantic resources composed by the lexical databases WordNet [26], FrameNet
[27] and by a branch of the top level ontology DOLCE [28] related to the event
modelling. In this case, the amount of semantic knowledge selected for the
realization of the Cognitive Engine (one of the systems developed within the
MindEye Program) and for its evaluation, despite by far larger w.r.t. the stan-
dard ad-hoc solutions, was tailored on the specific needs of the system itself.
It, in fact, was aimed at solving a precise task of event recognition trough a
video-surveillance intelligent machinery; therefore only the ontological knowl-
edge about the events was selectively embedded in it. While this is a reasonable
approach in an applicative context, still does not allow to test the general cog-
nitive mechanisms of a Cognitive Architecture on a general, multi faceted and
multi-domain, knowledge. Therefore it does not allow to evaluate strictu sensu
to what extent the designed heuristics allowing to retrieve and process, from a
massive and composite knowledge base, conceptual knowledge can be considered
satisfyicing w.r.t. the human performances.
More recent works have tried to completely overcome at least the size prob-
lem of the knowledge level. To this class of works belongs that one proposed by
Salvucci [29] aiming at enriching the knowledge model of the Declarative Mem-
ory of ACT-R with a world-level knowledge base such as DBpedia (i.e. the se-
mantic version of Wikipedia represented in terms of ontological formalisms) and
a previous one proposed in [30] presenting an integration of the ACT-R Declar-
11It is worth-noting that all of the attempts have been performed on ACT-R that seems
to be currently the available CA paying more attention to carefully constraint its knowledge
infrastructure to the insights coming from the results of the experimental cognitive science
w.r.t. the representation and reasoning procedures operating at the knowledge level.
14
ative and Procedural Memory with the Cyc ontology [31] (one of the widest on-
tological resources currently available containing more than 230,000 concepts).
Both the wide-coverage integrated ontological resources, however, represents
conceptual information in terms of symbolic structures and encounter the stan-
dard problems affecting this class of formalisms: i) they are not well equipped to
deal with common-sense knowledge representation and reasoning (since approx-
imate comparisons are hard and computationally intensive to implement with
graph-like representations), and ii) the typology of encoded knowledge is biased
towards the “classical” (but unsatisfactory) representation of concepts in terms
of necessary and sufficient conditions ([24]). In other terms: these ontology-
based systems, if considered in isolation, only allow de facto, to represent (and
reason on) one part of the whole spectrum of conceptual information12. On the
other hand, the so called common-sense knowledge components (i.e. those that,
allow to characterize and process conceptual information in terms of prototypes,
exemplars or theories and described above) is largely absent. Common-sense
conceptual knowledge, however, is exactly the type of cognitive information cru-
cially used by humans for heuristic reasoning and decision making and therefore
represents a necessary aspect to be integrated in CAs aiming at providing an
explanatory role of some sorts in the science of mind.
It is worth-noting that some of the described limitations are partially over-
come by the above mentioned works, since the integration of such wide-coverage
ontological knowledge bases with the ACT-R Declarative Memory allows to pre-
12In concrete applications, in fact, the information usually used by adopting ontological
knowledge resources is that one concerning the taxonomical relations between concepts since
it based on necessary and sufficient conditions and allows to perform efficiently forms of au-
tomatic monotonic reasoning. The remaining common-sense characterization of concepts are
not modelled since, despite in the field of logic-oriented KR various fuzzy and non-monotonic
extensions of DL formalisms have been designed to deal with such aspects, various theoretical
and practical problems remain unsolved and, in general, an acceptable KR framework able
to provide a practically usable trade-off regarding language expressivity and complexity has
been not yet achieved [24].
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serve the possibility of using the common-sense conceptual processing mech-
anisms available in that architecture (e.g. prototype and exemplars based
categorization). Therefore, to a certain extent, dealing with the size prob-
lem also allows to address some aspects concerning the heterogeneity problem.
Still, however, remains the problem concerning the lack of the representation of
common-sense information to which such common-sense architectural processes
can be applied: e.g. a conceptual retrieval based on prototypical traits (i.e. a
prototype-based categorization) cannot be performed on such integrated onto-
logical knowledge bases if these symbolic systems do not represent at all the
typical information associated to a given concept (and, as we will see in more
detail in section 7, this phenomenon is largely majoritarian). In addition, as
already mentioned in the section 3.2, it remains not yet addressed the prob-
lem concerning the interaction, in a general and principled way, of the different
types of common-sense processes involving different representations of the same
conceptual entity.
In the light of the arguments presented above it can be argued, therefore, that
the current proposed solutions for dealing with the knowledge problems in CAs
are not completely satisfactory. In particular, the integrations with huge world-
level ontological knowledge bases can be considered a necessary solution for
solving size problem. It is, however, insufficient for dealing with the knowledge
homogeneity problem and with the integration of the common-sense conceptual
mechanisms activated on heterogeneous bodies of knowledge, as assumed in the
heterogeneous representational perspective.
In the next sections we outline three possible alternative solutions that, de-
spite being not yet fully developed are, in perspective, suitable to account for
both for the heterogeneous aspects in conceptualization and for the size prob-
lems. In doing so we will outline how they share the same insights about the
neural level of representation (adopted in most CAs because of its efficacy in
perceptual-based tasks). Namely, such approaches converge on the idea that
the problems affecting the knowledge level can be better addressed by focussing
on more abstract levels of representations w.r.t that one available in neural
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networks. In this perspective, the interesting aspect concerning neural repre-
sentations consists in the definition and development of transformation methods
allowing to pass from low-level representations to more abstract ones. As we
will show, such methods already exists and have been successfully employed
in the area of computational cognitive science in systems aiming at providing
a reconciled and unified view of the theories of concepts based on prototypes,
exemplars, and theory-like structures.
4. Semantic Pointers
The Semantic Pointers approach is a representational perspective currently
investigated in the context of the biologically inspired SPAUN architecture [32].
Semantic pointers architecture sees concepts as symbol-like vectorial represen-
tations that result from different kind of transformation processes of low-level
neural representations in further high-level representations that function to sup-
port cognitive processes like categorization, inference, and language use. The
core idea behind this approach is that the activity of a population of neurons
at any given time can be interpreted as representing a vector.
The SPAUN architecture, assuming this perspective, has been successfully
used to replicate three paradigmatic categorization studies concerning prototype-
based categorization, exemplars-based categorization and theory-theory based
categorization [33]. Such results show that the provided representational ap-
proach can account for different kinds of categorisation processes assumed in
the heterogeneous perspective. However, it is agnostic w.r.t. how such pro-
cesses interact each other in the case of multiple available representations for
the same conceptual entity. From the size perspective, on the other hand, this
approach has been currently exploited for representing the human-sized lexical
knowledge structured in the Wordnet taxonomy in terms of biologically plausible
and scalable neural network representations [34].
In this approach, the interpretation of neural representations as vectors is
obtained through different kind of transformation operations, namely: circular
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convolution, vector addition and involution [34]. In the circular convolution op-
eration two input neural populations, each representing a vector, are connected
to an intermediary population that projects to an output population a vector
that is the convolution of the two input vectors. The Vector addition operation
plays, on the other hand, the role of a superposition operator. In particular,
it allows multiple bindings to be stored in a single vector. Finally, the vec-
tor involution operation is an approximate inverse with respect to the circular
convolution. As reported by the authors ’the circular convolution, vector ad-
dition, and involution operations can be thought of as vector analogs of the
familiar algebraic operations of multiplication, addition, and taking the recip-
rocal, respectively’ [34]. In this sense, the Semantic Pointer perspective seems
to provide an effective set of operational tools to proceed from a lower level of
representation to another, more abstract, one.
Summing up: for what concerns the size problem, as mentioned, this ap-
proach has proven to be usable to neurally represent human-level lexical knowl-
edge. On the other hand, i.e. w.r.t. the heterogeneity problem, it represents
a more powerful, but still incomplete account, of the common-sense typicality-
based processes executable on conceptual representations. In particular: the
framework has been proven able to replicate the full spectrum of typicality
effects studied in human cognition including (and differently from the other
proposals reviewed) the theory-theory approach 13. However it still does not
provide any account concerning the dynamics of interaction and the harmo-
nization of the plethora of processes involving the conceptual representations
assumed to co-exist according to the heterogeneous hypothesis. Therefore, in
this sense, the same objection raised for the current state of development of the
13In this respect it is worth-noting that the methods employed by the Semantic Pointers Ar-
chitectures to provide an abstract interpretation of neural mechanisms and representation, are
completely compatible (and integrable) with some mechanisms provided by cognitive archi-
tectures dealing with the neural representations. For example: they can be easily reproduced
within the sub symbolic activation mechanisms of a cognitive architecture such as ACT-R.
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knowledge level of the standard CAs remains unanswered. As a consequence,
currently, also the explanatory power of the Semantic Pointer Architecture w.r.t.
the cognitive theories and the experimental results that it is able to replicate
is very limited (since the replication of such categorization experiments did not
lead to any kind of additional explanation of these, already known, phenomena).
This aspect represents a symptom that, in order to account for the interaction
of the heterogeneous mechanisms operating over different, but interlinked, rep-
resentations the focus on the neural level is, in some sense, unnecessary and can
be demanded to other classes of representations having the advantage of being
less opaque.
5. Conceptual Spaces as Intermediate Level
Conceptual Space [35] have been proposed by Peter Ga¨rdenfors as an in-
termediate level of representation between the subsymbolic and the symbolic
ones. It has been argued that the integration of this level enables to overcome
some classical problems specifically related to the sub symbolic and symbolic
representations considered in isolation [36]. Conceptual Spaces are a geomet-
rical framework for the representation of knowledge14 and can be thought as
a metric space in which entities are characterized by quality dimensions [35].
To each quality dimension is associated a geometrical (topological or metrical)
structure. In some cases, such dimensions can be directly related to perceptual
mechanisms; examples of this kind are temperature, weight, brightness, pitch.
In other cases, dimensions can be more abstract in nature. In this setting,
concepts correspond to convex regions, and regions with different geometrical
properties correspond to different sorts of concepts [35]. Here, prototypes and
prototypical reasoning have a natural geometrical interpretation: prototypes
correspond to the geometrical centre of a convex region (the centroid). Also
14In the last fifteen years, such framework has been employed in a vast range of AI appli-
cations spanning from visual perception [37] to robotics [38], from question answering [39] to
music perception [40] (see [41] for a recent overview).
19
exemplars-based representation can be represented as points in a multidimen-
sional space, and their similarity can be computed as the intervening distance
between each two points, based on some suitable metrics (such as Euclidean
and Manhattan distance etc.).
Recently some available conceptual categorization systems, explicitly as-
suming the heterogeneous representational hypothesis and coupling Conceptual
Spaces representations and ontological knowledge bases, have been developed.
For our purposes, we will consider here the DUAL PECCS system [42]: such
system has been integrated with available CAs by explicitly designing the flow of
interaction between the common-sense, non-monotonic, categorization strategies
(based on prototypes and exemplars and operating on conceptual spaces repre-
sentations) and the standard deductive processes (operating on the ontological
conceptual component). The harmonization regarding such different classes of
mechanisms has been devised based on the tenets coming from the dual pro-
cess theory of reasoning (see section 7). Additonally, in this system, also the
flow of interaction occurring within the class of non monotonic categorization
mechanisms (i.e. prototypes and exemplars-based categorisation) has been de-
vised and is dealt with at the Conceptual Spaces level. This latter aspect is of
particular interest in the light of the multifaceted problem concerning the het-
erogeneity of the encoded knowledge. In fact, since the design of the interaction
of the the different processes operating with heterogeneous representations still
represents a largely unaddressed problem in current CAs, this system shows the
relative easiness that the Conceptual Spaces framework provides to naturally
model the dynamics between prototype and exemplars-based processes.
For what concerns the size problem, the possible grounding of the Concep-
tual Spaces representational framework with symbolic structures enables the
integration with wide-coverage knowledge bases such CYC (as provided, for
example, in DUAL PECCS [42]), DBpedia or similar.
An additional element of interest concerning the advantages provided by in-
troducing the adoption of Conceptual Spaces as intermediate representational
level in CAs regards its capability of addressing a classical problem in formal
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conceptualisation: namely the problem of reconciling compositionally and typ-
icality effects (for more details on this issue we remind to [43]) 15. This aspect
does not affect, per se, the size problem but that one concerning the knowledge
heterogeneity (since it assumes the existence of typicality-based representations)
and has been shown to be problematic for symbolic/logic-oriented approaches
[45]) as well as, according to the well-known argument by Fodor and Phylishin
[46], for classical connectionist approaches. On the other hand this aspect can
be formally handled by recurring to Conceptual Spaces (as shown in [43, 47]).
Interestingly enough, this problem can also be treated by the Semantic Pointers
perspective (once, in this framework, the more abstract level of representation
is reached through the transformation operations mentioned above). The simi-
larity between the two approaches is another indirect suggestion that the neural
level of representation, per se, can be considered not directly necessary to deal
with the problematic aspects affection the conceptual representation and pro-
cessing capabilities in CAs.
Summing up: endowing CAs with Conceptual Spaces seems, in principle,
a promising way to deal with both the size and the heterogeneity problems of
conceptual representations. There is, however, still an open problem to explicitly
face for such approach. In particular, for what concerns the size issue, there is
15Broadly speaking this aspect regards the problem of dealing, in a coherent way, with the
compositionality of prototypical representations. According to a well-known argument ([44];
[45]), prototypes are not compositional. In brief, the argument runs as follows: consider a
concept like pet fish. It results from the composition of the concept pet and of the concept
fish. However, the prototype of pet fish cannot result from the composition of the prototypes
of a pet and a fish: a typical pet is furry and warm, a typical fish is grayish, but a typical
pet fish is neither furry and warm nor grayish. The possibility of explaining, in a coherent
way, this type of combinatorial and generative phenomenon regards a crucial aspect of the
conceptual processing capabilities in human cognition and concerns and some crucial high-level
cognitive abilities such as that ones concerning conceptual composition, metaphor generation
and creative thinking. Dealing with this problem requires the harmonization of two conflicting
requirements in representational systems: the need of syntactic, generative, compositonality
(typical of logical systems) and that one concerning the exhibition of typicality effects.
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still lack of knowledge bases encoded in terms of Conceptual Spaces comparable
with the sizes of the ontological KB. Some initial attempts to automatically
learn and encode wide-coverage Conceptual Spaces knowledge bases by starting
by linguistic resources such as BabelNet16 and ConceptNet17 have been done
[48, 49], but still there is a huge gap to cover and this aspect requires further
investigations.
6. Neural-Symbolic Integrations and Extended Declarative Memories
As mentioned in section 3.5. there are different attempts that have been de-
veloped to implicitly address the size and the knowledge heterogeneity problems
in CAs. Notably such attempts, that share the same limitations and possibilities
of the others, have been developed within an architecture such as ACT-R that
presents an hybrid approach to conceptual representation and reasoning combin-
ing sub-symbolic based activation mechanisms, operating on classical symbolic
structures, and rule based representational structures (see section 3.2). Since
the current state of the art achieved by the works done on this CA, and the
possibile future developments, have been already mentioned in section 3.5, we
focus here is showing how the underlying assumptions adopted by ACT-R is
compliant with both the Semantic Pointers Perspective and with the approach
claiming for the advantages provided by an intermediate Conceptual Spaces
representation connecting sub-symbolic and symbolic levels. W.r.t. the first
approach, in particular, it has been showed how the integration of ACT-R with
a connectionist architecture allows to learn without any supervision, associa-
tions in object recognition between percepts and categorical labels. [50]. The
way in which such elements are integrated in fully compliant with the Semantic
Pointer perspective and is based on the shared assumption that leveraging and
abstracting on more high-level forms of representation is a necessary element
to produce advancements that cannot be achieved by operating exclusively at
16http://babelnet.org/
17http://conceptnet5.media.mit.edu/
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the neural level. W.r.t. the Conceptual spaces approach, on the other hand,
the neuro-symbolic integration allows to deal with the the classical problem
concerning the need of reconciling compositionally and typicality effects in con-
ceptualization. The approach developed in ACT-R, in fact, belongs to the class
of the so-called neo-connectionist approaches that, differently from the classical
connectionist systems, are able to deal with limited forms of compositionality
in neural networks (see [51] on this point).
Interestingly enough, there are also attempts that have shown how the neuro-
symbolic approach adopted by ACT-R can be used as an intermediate functional
level in a compex system combining different Cognitive Architectures, such SO-
DAS [52] and SOAR, to which are demanded different cognitive tasks (e.g. the
high level symbolic and knowledge-drive reasoning in SOAR and the low-level
perceptual one to SODAS) that are more naturally dealt with in different en-
vironments [53]. This idea is somehow similar to that one of using Conceptual
Spaces an intermediate level of representations since, from a knowledge pro-
cessing perspective, the types of tasks that such hybrid architecture is able to
account are essentially the same.
ACT-R has been also enabled to generalize over perceptual transductions by
applying fine-grained models of the world to concrete scenarios. As already dis-
cussed, in order to fulfill this goal, ACT-R needs to properly encapsulate those
models – or ontologies – and exploit them for pattern recognition and high-level
reasoning. Since ACT-R declarative module supports a relatively coarse-grained
semantics based on slot-value pairs, and the procedural system is not optimal to
effectively manage complex logical constructs (e.g., 2nd order), a specific exten-
sion has been designed to make ACT-R suitable to fulfill knowledge-intensive
tasks. Accordingly, the work outlined in [13] proposed an expansion of ACT-R
with SCONE [54]. SCONE is an open–source knowledge-base system intended
for use as a component in many different software applications: it provides a
LISP-based framework to represent and reason over symbolic common–sense
knowledge. Unlike most diffuse KB systems (e.g. ontologies), SCONE is not
based on Description Logics [55]: its inference engine adopts marker–passing
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algorithms [54] (originally designed for massive parallel computing) to perform
fast queries at the price of losing logical completeness and decidability. In par-
ticular, SCONE represents knowledge as a semantic network whose nodes are
locally weighted (marked) and associated to arcs (wires18) in order to optimize
basic reasoning tasks (e.g. class membership, transitivity, inheritance of prop-
erties, etc). The philosophy that inspired SCONE is straightforward: from
vision to speech, humans exploit the brain’s massive parallelism to fulfill all
recognition tasks; if we want to build an AGI system that is able to deal with
the large amount of knowledge required in common-sense reasoning, we need
to rely on a mechanism that is fast and effective enough to simulate parallel
search. Shortcomings are not an issue since humans are not perfect inference
engines either. Accordingly, SCONE implementation of marker–passing algo-
rithms aims at simulating a pseudo-parallel search by assigning specific marker
bits to each knowledge unit. For example, if we want to query a KB to get
all the parts of cars, SCONE would assign a marker M1 to the A-node car
and search for all the statements in the knowledge base where M1 is the A-wire
(domain) of the relation part-of, returning all the classes in the range of the
relation (also called ‘B-nodes’). SCONE would finally assign the marker bit M2
to all B-nodes, also retrieving all the inherited subclasses19. The modularization
and implementation of an ontology with SCONE allows for an effective formal
representation and inferencing of core ontological properties of world entities.
Note that the integration of SCONE into ACT-R respects the requirements of
the cognitive architecture, especially in terms of limited-capacity buffers con-
straining the communication between a dedicated SCONE module and ACT-R’s
default modules. Also, the SCONE marker-passing algorithms are comparable
to ACT-R spreading activation, leaving open the possibility of a deeper in-
tegration of the two frameworks in future work. The integration of ACT-R
18In general, a wire can be conceived as a binary relation whose domain and range are
referred to, respectively, as A-node and B-node.
19We refer the reader to [54] for details concerning marker–passing algorithms.
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with SCONE represents, in other words, a suitable way to connect architec-
tural mechanisms to a symbolic knowledge base. W.r.t. the external extensions
provided with wide-coverage KBs (and discussed in section 3.5), however, such
approach still needs to face the problem concerning the size aspect (since the
SCONE KBs are not comparable with Cyc or DbPedia). For what concerns
the heterogeneity problem, on the other hand, such integration seems to pro-
vide a straightforward way to combine common-sense reasoning operating on
symbolic knowledge structures. Still, however, the problem concerning the in-
tegration of heterogeneous processes acting on different bodies of knowledge is
not addressed.
Summing up: all these presented approaches can be seen as alternative, but
compliant, solutions in order to develop a more comprehensive (and constrained
to human cognition) account to conceptual representation and processing mech-
anism in Cognitive Architectures.
As we will show in the next section, a further axis that could be considered
by the current CAs in order to reconcile, under a unified umbrella, both the size
and and the knowledge heterogeneity problems is represented by the so called
dual process hypothesis of reasoning and rationality.
7. A Dual Process Approach for the Heterogeneous Integration of
Cognitive Mechanisms
The approaches presented in the previous sections converge on the insight
that the problem concerning the design of the interaction (and integration) of
the heterogeneous processes operating with different representations (i.e. the
heterogeneity problem) can be attacked in a more efficacious and natural way
by operating at more abstract levels of representation than that one proposed
by connectionist representations.
In our opinion an additional element that is worth to consider, in current and
future research, in order to determine, at the architectural level, the interaction
strategies between different types of mechanisms operating on heterogeneous
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representations, is represented by the dual process hypothesis of reasoning and
rationality. According to dual process theories ([56], [57], [58]) two different
types of cognitive processes and systems exist, which have been called respec-
tively System(s) 1 and System(s) 2.
Systems 1 processes are automatic. They are phylogenetically older and
shared by humans and other animal species. They are innate and control in-
stinctive behaviors, so they do not depend on training or particular individual
abilities and, in general, they are cognitively undemanding. They are associa-
tive and operate in a parallel and fast way. Moreover, Systems 1 processes are
not consciously accessible to the subject.
Systems 2 processes are phylogenetically recent and are peculiar to the hu-
man species. They are conscious and cognitively penetrable (i.e. accessible
to consciousness) and based on explicit rule following. As a consequence, if
compared to Systems 1, Systems 2 processes are sequential and slower, and
cognitively demanding. Performances that depend on Systems 2 processes are
usually affected by acquired skills and differences in individual capabilities.
The dual process approach was initially proposed to account for systematic
errors in reasoning. Such errors (consider, e.g., the classical examples of the
selection task or the conjunction fallacy) should be ascribed to fast, associative
and automatic type 1 processes, while type 2 is responsible for the slow and
cognitively demanding activity of producing answers that are correct concerning
the canons of normative rationality.
In general, many aspects concerning of the psychology of concepts have
presumably to do with fast, type 1 systems and processes, while others can be
plausibly ascribed to type 2. In particular, the ability to make explicit, high-level
inferences involving conceptual knowledge, and capacity to justify them, can be
considered as a type 2 process. While, on the other hand, the common-sense
mechanisms operating with typical representations (e.g. prototype, exemplars
or theory-based categorization) can be considered type 1 processes.
A possibile way to evaluate the importance of dual process strategies in
knowledge processing can be provided by testing to what extent an AI system
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designed with this perspective has a “common knowledge about the world that
is possessed by every schoolchild and has the methods for making obvious in-
ferences from this knowledge” [59]: such common-sense based evaluation task
is known to be on of the grand challenges of AI and Cognitive Modelling in
general [60]. In doing so we can account for the importance of the dual process
approach by analysing the results obtained by the system by executing S1 or
S2 processes alone or in combination.
By following the general suggestions presented in [61] we tested the DUAL-
PECCS categorisation system (see section 5), integrated with the ACT-R mech-
anisms, in a conceptual categorization task very similar to the psychological test
known as “Word Reasoning” 20. For human subjects, the Word Reasoning task
consists in identifying a concept based on one to three clues. The testee might
be told ‘You can see through it’ as a first clue; ‘It is square and you can open
it’, and so on. The processing required by a Word Reasoning items goes be-
yond retrieval because the testee has to integrate the clues and choose among
alternative hypotheses. Unfortunately, as reported by [61], the standard specific
questions provided for this task in the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of
Intelligence are proprietary. Nonetheless, the general structure of each sentence
is public. For this purpose we have therefore re-used a dataset composed of 112
linguistic descriptions (corresponding to very simple riddles) designed by a team
of linguists and neuroscientist in the frame of a research project investigating
neural correlates of lexical processing and already used for previous comparisons
between humans and systems performances 21 [39].
Such descriptions exhibit a structure similar to that of the Word Reasoning
task: on average, no more than 3 cues are present in each riddle. An example of
20For this experiment the system relies on a Conceptual Spaces KB of 300 concepts, exe-
cuting S1 processes, integrated with the corresponding classes in the Open Cyc ontology via
Wordnet IDs (see [42] for the details abut the integration). The S2 processes are operated
on the ontological knowledge base and work as control mechanism w.r.t. the categorisation
results provided by type 1 processes which are non monotonic in nature.
21The full list of descriptions is publicly available at: http://goo.gl/EYJozw.
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such descriptions is “The mice hunter with whiskers and long tail”, where the
expected category to be retrieved was cat, and in particular its representation
corresponding to the “prototype of cat”; conversely, a description such as “The
felin mice hunter without fur” was expected to lead as answer to “exemplar
of canadian-sphynx”. The expected categorical targets represent a gold stan-
dard, since they correspond to the results provided by 30 human subjects in a
psychological experimentation and already described and presented elsewhere
[62, 42].
For such descriptions we have recorded the categorization capabilties of the
system by analyzing: i) when the expected categorical target is obtained by
S1 processes in isolation ii) which role is played by the S2 types of processes
iii) whether the S2 types of processes considered in isolation would have been
able to provide the same of better results w.r.t. the S1 processes considered
in isolation. The test of the efficacies of S2 types of processes in isolation (the
third condition mentioned above) has been executed by quering large ontological
knowledge bases such as Cyc [31] and DBPedia. The differences between the
two systems are reported as well. For querying both Cyc and DBPedia we have
manually extracted the information from the text and have transformed then
in SPARQL queries. For example: the description ”A big, black and white sea
bird that swims and cannot fly” corresponds to the following SPARQL query in
DbPedia (provided here with a N3 notation to favour the readability) 22
SELECT DISTINCT ? animal
WHERE {? animal
dbpedia−owl : c l a s s dbpedia : Bird ;
dcterms : s u b j e c t ? s1 ;
dcterms : s u b j e c t ? s2 .
? page dbpedia−owl : fami ly ? animal .
22The complete list of queries is available: https://goo.gl/fnwwqO.
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FILTER( conta in s ( b i f : lower ( s t r (? page ) ) , ” white ”)
| | conta in s ( b i f : lower ( s t r (? page ) ) , ” b lack ” ) ) .
FILTER( conta in s ( b i f : lower ( s t r (? s1 ) ) , ” f l y ”)
| | conta in s ( b i f : lower ( s t r (? s1 ) ) , ” f l i g h t ”)
&& conta in s ( b i f : lower ( s t r (? s1 ) ) , ” l e s s ” ) ) .
FILTER( conta in s ( b i f : lower ( s t r (? s2 ) ) , ” sea ” ) ) .
Table 1: Experimental results assessing the usefulness of the S1-S2 integration processes in
a categorisation task w.r.t. the S1 or S2 processes considered in isolation.
Cases where S2 confirmed the category returned by S1 99.0% (111/112)
Cases where S1 (alone) returned the expected category 77.7% (87/112)
Cases where S2 (Cyc) alone returned the expected category 1.6% (2/112)
Cases where S2 (DbPedia) alone returned the expected category 2.7% (3/112)
The results obtained by this experimentation are reported in table 1 23.
7.1. Discussion
An interesting aspect revealed by this analysis is that, the tested DUAL-
PECCS system (explicitly based on both a heterogeneous representational hy-
pothesis and on the dual process assumption), results to be able to categorise,
thanks to the S1 component, stimuli with typical, though ontologically inco-
herent, descriptions. An example of such a case is the result obtained for the
stimulus “The big fish that eats plankton”. In this case the expected proto-
typical answer is whale. However, whales are mammals, not fishes. In the
adopted system, the S1 component returns the “whale” answer by resorting to
23The results for the S1 categorization performance cover the full pipeline of the DUAL-
PECCS system including the information extraction step from the natural language. Therefore
some errors are due to the difficulty of this step. Without IE step the performance of the S1
system increase to the 89.3%.
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the prototypical knowledge. However, when then the output of S1 is checked
with S2 processes against the Open Cyc ontology (the symbolic KB used in
DUAL-PECCS), an inconsistency is detected and explained as follows:
subClassOf ( ( cetacean ) , ( p l a c e n t a l mammal) )
subClassOf ( (mammal) , (warm−blooded animal ) )
subClassOf ( ( newClass ) , ( whale ) )
type ( newIndiv , ( newClass ) )
subClassOf ( ( newClass ) , ( f i s h ) )
d i s j o in tWith ( (warm−blooded animal ) , ( cold−blooded animal ) )
subClassOf ( ( f i s h ) , ( cold−blooded animal ) )
subClassOf ( ( p l a c e n t a l mammal) , (mammal) )
subClassOf ( ( whale ) , ( cetacean ) )
Laconic Explanation : Class ( whale ) i s not ( cold−blooded animal )
but i s (warm−blooded animal )
As shown in the example above, the S2 processes activated by the ontological
component provides, when tested on the ontological model, the whole logical
path leading to the inconsistency of the S1 result (it also provides a summary
of the complete explanation, a laconic explanation, that is easier to read and
understand for human users). Due to the detected inconsistency, the first result
of S1 is withdrawn and the second best result provided by S1 is tested. As the
consistency of the second S1 result in (Atlantic Salmon in this case) is tested
against the ontology and results compliant with the ontological model, then this
solution is returned by the S2 component. This example shows in which cases
the cycle of interaction between S1 and S2 processes can lead to revised and
interesting conclusions.
An additional datum coming out from this evaluation is that S1 mostly pro-
vided an output coherent with the model in the S2 component (there is only
one case, i.e. the one described above, where S2 component corrects the out-
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put of S1). This datum is of interest in that, although it is postulated that
the reasoning check performed by S2 is beneficial to ensure a refinement of the
categorisation process, in this experimentation S2 did not reveal any significant
improvement to the output provided by S1. This is, on the other hand, in line
with the assumption that most of the common-sense answers can be success-
fully addressed, in the heterogeneous perspective, by the typical representational
components adopting S1 processes. In addition, this datum can be additionally
explained by considering the fact that the adopted dataset contains, as above
mentioned, exclusively common-sense linguistic descriptions to be categorized.
In cases of datasets with a different type of descriptions and involving, for ex-
ample, the categorization of items based on necessary and sufficient condition
(e.g. as it happens in the mathematical domain) our prediction is that the S2
processes operating on classical ontological representation could categorize very
well the correct answer since, in this case, the activated reasoning process would
correspond to a very simple form of deductive categorization that has a different
nature w.r.t. the S1 processes.
Finally, the current analysis showed that the S2 knowledge components (con-
sidered in isolation) are not able de facto to provide answers to most of the pro-
vided common-sense queries. The completely inadequate, or absent, answers
provided by the tested large-scale ontological systems (Cyc and DbPedia) is a
result compliant with the problems mentioned in section 3.5 and affecting this
class of ontological structures (namely the fact that, due to the tarkian-like se-
mantics assumed by the underlying formalims, the common-sense information
is largely absent in such representations). In other words, this is a symptom of
the fact that such representational frameworks need to be integrated with other
frameworks in order to able to represent and reason on common-sense infor-
mation. In general, the results obtained by this preliminary analysis suggests
that, for common-sense reasoning and retrieval, the improvement provided by
the adoption of the S2 mechanisms operating on classical symbolic structures is
very limited.
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On the other hand, it is also clear, however, that it is not possibile to explain
the entire cognition of a cognitive agent exclusively in terms of S1 processes.
Therefore, given the importance of the dual process approach in explaining how
to harmonize and integrate different kind of reasoning processes assumed to co-
exist in a heterogeneous representational perspective, additional investigations
are needed.
In particular, in our opinion, such analyses should investigate: i) in which
cases the S2 processes play a more relevant role w.r.t. that one proposed here
ii) in which cases the S2 processes are not at all evoked by a cognitive system,
since the need to react in real time is more pressing. Since there is not a
clear answer to such questions, such aspects will involve, in our opinion, the
future research agenda of both the cognitive psychology and cognitive (artificial)
systems research.
8. Conclusions
In this paper we identified and characterized two main aspects concerning
the knowledge level of the current CAs, namely the size and the homogeneous
typology of the encoded knowledge. We have argued that, on the basis of the
results coming from the experimental research in cognitive science, such aspects
need to be addressed in order to structurally bind the knowledge leve of the
Cognitive Architectures to the constraints and the challenges faced by human
cognition in everyday knowledge processing tasks. Additionally, we have argued
that these issues represent, from a technological perspective, a crucial challenge
to address in order to be able to build cognitive agents able to operate and make
decisions in general scenarios by exploiting a plethora of integrated reasoning
mechanisms. Based on these assumption we have provided an analysis of the
most relevant CAs in the state of the art: we showed how all of them encounter,
at different levels of granularity, some problems in dealing, jointly, with the
above mentioned aspects. In the final part of the paper we have presented
three different, but compliant, approaches that converge on the insight that,
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in order to address the problems affecting the knowledge level in CAs, the
focus of attention should be posed on more abstract level of representation
w.r.t. that one addressed by neural representations (the analyzed approaches
are: the Semantic Pointers approach; the approach based on Conceptual Spaces
as intermediate representational level; and the novel Neuro-Symbolic Approach
embedded in ACT-R).
Finally, since a crucial problem in the heterogeneous representational per-
spective is represented by the harmonization of different kinds reasoning pro-
cesses, we have preliminary investigated the usefulness of the dual process ap-
proach of reasoning by analysing the results obtained by the DUAL-PECCS
system in a categorization tasks. The obtained results suggest that, while the
general heuristic provided by the dual approach represents a suitable way to in-
tegrate different reasoning mechanisms, it is still not clear (nor from a theoretical
and from an applicative point of view) if both the dual process mechanisms are
always activated. Therefore it results still not clear whether the hypothesized
dual processes are worth considering as a general architectural mechanism (and,
as such, worth implementing in the CAs processes operating on the conceptual
structures of a cognitive agent) or as a local mechanisms, activated under certain
circumstances. As above mentioned, an answer to this question will require a
joint investigation effort of both the cognitive psychology an the cognitive mod-
elling community.
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